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Abstract—In EU project E-Price it is proposed to attribute 
reliability to the Transmission System Operator (TSO) and the 
drive for efficiency to the Balance Responsible Parties (BRP). 
Two main ideas are proposed. The first idea is to make BRPs 
themselves responsible for estimating their uncertainty in real 
time and hedge their imbalance risks, yielding the proposal to 
introduce dual-sided markets for ancillary services. The second 
idea is to reduce the conservatism in exploiting the inter-area 
transmission capacity (ATC), while still guaranteeing sufficient 
degrees of reliability. This paper explains, elucidates and 
concludes, based on qualitative arguments and supported by 
quantitative simulations and calculations, that both proposals 
are beneficial to improve the stated compromise between 
reliability and economy. 
Index Terms—Power system, ancillary services, network 
constraints, reliability, efficiency. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Future developments in power systems pose huge 
challenges for its reliable and economic operation. E-Price 
(FP7 EU project: Price-based control of Power Systems) 
focuses on the real-time power imbalance, which arises as a 
consequence of errors in the prediction of both production 
and demand. As this (real) power imbalance is expected to 
increase, both in size and in frequency, present arrangements 
to cope with this imbalance may become insufficient. They 
are neither reliable nor economic anymore. This project 
proposes an advanced ICT and control framework for 
ancillary services (reserve capacity). This framework allows a 
more intelligent solution by giving consumers and producers 
clear, real-time financial incentives to adapt their 
consumption/production according to the actual needs of the 
power system. The E-Price framework proposes a two-sided 
market for ancillary services [4]. This enables BRPs to 
guarantee sufficient amount of ancillary services when 
needed to reduce their imbalance costs. The market allows 
them to make a calculated decision whether it is cheaper to 
reserve the ancillary services available with own facilities, to 
buy/sell them on the market or to rely on the, a priori 
unknown and higher imbalance prices of the TSO. The TSO 
assesses whether the spatial distribution of reserve capacity in 
the network can satisfactorily cope with expected classes of 
disturbances. On the other hand, the E-Price design is based 
on a distributed control structure, enabled by a fast ICT 
infrastructure and advanced control theory to reliably and 
economically deal with ancillary services. Decisions by 
consumers, producers, power exchanges and TSOs can be 
taken locally, based on local or national preferences and 
regulation. Still, the embedded incentives of the proposed 
framework can guarantee that all these local decisions 
together contribute to the global EU objectives of the power 
system: a reliable and efficient electric energy supply.  
 
II. E-PRICE CONTRIBUTIONS 
In the power system we distinguish two modes of 
operation: (day) ahead markets and real time. The ahead 
markets clear the bids of BRPs for energy (EX) and ancillary 
services (AS), yielding prices and energy volumes for each 
time period (PTU). The TSO has to cope with the network 
congestion in an optimal and reliable way. In real time 
production and consumption will deviate from their 
predictions and a power imbalance will occur. The TSO calls 
the available ancillary services (cleared at the AS markets) 
when needed to control the power balance. With proper 
incentives in place, BPRs are motivated to cooperate to 
maintain the system reliability. So, E-Price explores the idea 
of a dual-sided market for ancillary services to cope with 
uncertainty. It is based on risk management by BRPs of their 
own expected imbalances and their supplied/requested AS 
capacities. A presently existing approach for a BRP to reduce 
its imbalance risks is to utilize the intraday market (IDM) by 
contracting energy volumes. As the intraday market clears 
only a few hours before real-time, the remaining uncertainty 
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after closing of ahead markets can be traded on the intraday 
market, although in some markets the liquidity is very low 
and, consequently, the uncertainty is quite large. Using AS 
markets or IDM is different: In the AS markets capacities are 
reserved and only used when needed, in the IDM volumes are 
traded, which have to be realized. The realization of these 
concepts required the development of new algorithms and the 
integration of those algorithms describing the TSO, BRP and 
prosumers in both the ahead markets and/or in real-time. For 
the TSO the network constraints are now explicitly taken into 
account. For the BRPs the options are realized to bid at the 
same time on both the EX and the AS markets and to deal, in 
real-time, with their price-elastic prosumers. The bids for the 
energy and ancillary service markets are interdependent as 
they concern the same physical units. As the bids are based 
on assumptions and suffer from uncertainties, new algorithms 
have been designed to capture these uncertainties both in a 
deterministic and in a stochastic framework [1]. Based on 
historical information the behavior of renewables, other BRPs 
and the TSO (a BRP’s environment) is being estimated and 
used for better predictions for the coming day to improve the 
BRP’s own performance and/or maximize its profits.  
Based on the area control error (ACE) the TSO calculates in 
real time the needed control/balancing powerp and 
distributes it among the participating BRPs. The distribution 
factor αi is based on the cleared contributions of the BRPs in 
the ancillary service markets. A BRP has to optimize in real-
time the setpoints for its generating units and its real-time 
prices for its price-elastic prosumers to meet in each PTU the 
agreed volumes of the energy market (EX), the agreed 
volumes of bilateral trade (OTC) and possibly the volumes 
contracted by the TSO after closing the ahead markets to 
cope with network constraints (CT: counter trading). 
 
III. DUAL-SIDED ANCILLARY SERVICE MARKETS 
BRPs have the option to control their own uncertainty with 
their controllable power sources and/or by exploiting the 
sensitivity (e.g. for price) of their prosumers. In this section 
we focus on global level. There are several options, namely: 
 SSAS: Single sided AS market, as it exists nowadays in 
numerous countries, among which in The Netherlands 
 DSAS: Dual sided AS market, a novel concept proposed 
in E-Price. 
 Intraday market (IDM) 
In this section their characteristics are qualitatively compared. 
 
A. Ancillary services 
A TSO has to guarantee that sufficient reserve capacity is 
available when needed in real-time. Markets are created to 
allow bidding by BRPs with their resources. It is the market 
design that will guarantee that such a market can be 
successful. The market design has to be such that the markets 
are transparent, liquid, with minimal set of rules and such that 
gaming of any party, either TSO or a BRP, is prevented. In 
other words, the market arrangements and tuneable 
parameters have to be selected such that the following 2 
requirements can be guaranteed (as already formulated in the 
Dutch ancillary services arrangements): 
 
Forward/Ahead market: The risk of bidding is less or equal 
than the risk of not-bidding 
 
In real-time: The risk of a requested action is less or equal 
than the risk of a not-requested action 
 
 
1) Single-sided AS  
With the single-sided AS market (SSAS) approach, BRPs are 
obliged by law to offer their spare capacities to the TSO. 
They are free to assign any price on their bid. This bidding 
process is considered as a market, although a single-side 
market with one buyer (TSO) and many sellers (BRPs). This 
bidding ladder is known in advance. It is used in real-time. 
When needed the TSO will call these reserved capacities. The 
more capacity is called by the TSO, the higher the price will 
be. In general, the highest price occurring in a PTU will be 
price for AS in that PTU. The responsibility for reserving 
sufficient capacity is placed at the TSO. So, the TSO 
determines the size, the BRPs the price. 
 
2) Dual-sided markets 
With the dual-sided AS market (DSAS) approach, the BRPs 
themselves become responsible for their own uncertainties 
and reserving sufficient capacity to cover for them. It is 
allowed to rely on the TSO, but financial incentives make it 
attractive for them to collect on the DSAS the capacities they 
expect to need. These capacities have to come from other 
BRPs. Consequently, the DSAS has to be attractive both for 
the suppliers and for the requestors of AS. It has to be 
realized that bids (both as supply (S) and as request (R)) are 
capacities. There is uncertainty whether the supply bids will 
be activated or not. So, it can be estimated only with some 
probability how much will be called and needed. Only a 
posteriori the volumes are known. That makes it a different 
commodity compared with the day-ahead energy markets. 
After clearing of the ahead markets, both sizes [MWh] and 
prices are known.  
In contrast with the SSAS, where BRPs are enforced to offer 
their bids, the arrangements in the DSAS have to be attractive 
for BRPs to offer AS. If the rewards for a BRPs become only 
real when the offered capacity is called in real-time, and there 
is uncertainty whether the reserved and offered capacity will 
be called at all, there has to be an incentive to stimulate BRPs 
to bid sufficient amounts of their spare capacity as AS on the 
DSAS. In E-Price the following arrangements have been 
proposed to cope with the requirement to motivate both the 
supplier and the requestor of AS to participate at the DSAS. 
Being supplier of AS, a reward is received proportional with 
the cleared volume EAS,i(p) [MWh] and the cleared price 
 [€/MWh] in PTU p. Being requestor, a fee has to be 
paid. So, trading at the AS markets yields always a positive 
(for S) or negative profit (for R). In both markets the sum of 
the cleared volumes of suppliers and requestors is zero in 
each PTU. The fixed profits CASf,i [€] of BRP i after clearing 
the AS markets equals: 
   and   
 
The coefficient a>0 [-] is a market design parameter. 
Choosing it too small will reduce the incentive of a BRP for 
bidding to supply AS, choosing it too large will reduce the 
incentive of a BRP for bidding to request AS, so an optimal 
value of a exists which yields the largest participation and so 
the largest cleared capacity, and, in general, more efficiency 
so lower prices. In the AS market, the size of a PTU is 
assumed to be 15 minutes of 1 hour. In figure 1 the expected 
relations between the sizes of the offered capacities of both 
suppliers and requestors of AS at a DSAS are influenced by 
the market design parameter a. The best value of a is when the 
cleared or contracted capacity (red dot in figure 1) obtains its 
maximum size. 
 
Figure 1. Influence market design parameter a on contracted capacity with 
a1<a2<a3. The red dot symbolises the contracted volume. 
 
B. AS provision in real-time 
A BRP is in imbalance when at the end of a PTU its 
integrated control error Eimb,i(p) {= integral [P(k)] - Eref(p)} 
over one PTU, starting with value 0 at the start of PTU p} 
deviates from zero. Here, P(k) is its real power contribution 
to the grid and Eref(p) is its agreed energy contribution in that 
PTU. When in real-time a global imbalance of the area 
control error (ACE) exists, the TSO has to buy AS from AS-
suppliers to counteract this imbalance. The BRPs causing this 
imbalance have to pay for their imbalance. The TSO transfers 
the budgets from the BRPs causing imbalance to the BRPs 
supplying, on its requests, the needed AS. The following, 
generic remarks on prices can be made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Imbalance price as function of the size of the ACE. Blue curve 
represents single-sided markets, red double sided markets. 
In figure 2, the price at global level for AS (λAS) and for being 
in imbalance (λimb) is illustrated for the single (SSAS) and 
dual sided (DSAS) AS markets.  
In the single-sided AS market the TSO calls according to the 
bid ladder new AS reserves. As the pricing system is 
marginal pricing, the price will increase when more reserves 
are needed and are called. In the dual sided market, as long as 
the TSO can call its reserves cleared at the AS market, the 
price for being in imbalance will be constant. For BRPs who 
had cleared their needs at the DSAS, their imbalance is 
valued with the cleared AS price λAS (dotted line). For other 
BRPs being in imbalance the imbalance price λimb will be 
used (solid red line). In E-Price we have proposed to make 
the imbalance price higher than λAS to make participation in 
the DSAS more attractive. The parameter  (>1) is a market 
design parameter. Making it too small will not stimulate 
BRPs to reserve their needed AS capacities at the DSAS, 
selecting it too large will, unnecessarily, increase the 
imbalance costs.  
Remark: In general the DSAS price is higher than the SSAS 
price. From this point of view the DSAS is more attractive for 
a supplier of AS than for a requestor. In next sections, we will 
show that the indicated prices for AS and for imbalance are 
the MAXIMUM prices. In general, the prices for AS and 
imbalance are (considerably) lower for the requestors of AS 
and imbalance energy. In figure 3 the price to be paid by 
BRPi for AS (λAS) and for being in imbalance (λimb) is 
illustrated for the single and dual sided AS markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Price when being in imbalance (SSAS in blue, DSAS in red). 
 
SSAS - Single sided market: The imbalance price is a priori 
unknown and determined a posteriori. It depends fully on the 
global imbalance of the system and only partly on the own 
imbalance of the BRP. So, it is uncertain a priori but can be 
followed with some delay in real time. The uncertainty area is 
indicated as the large rectangular (blue) area in figure 3.  
DSAS - Dual sided market: As long as the imbalance of the 
BRP is below its cleared capacity EAS at the DSAS, the 
cleared price λAS of that market is fixed and known. When the 
imbalance is larger, the a priori unknown imbalance price λimb  
has to be paid. That price is a priori unknown and is indicated 
as the small rectangular (red) area in figure 3. It is certainly 
higher than λAS, but its real value depends on the offered bids 
of the AS-suppliers. Comparing both market outcomes 
(SSAS and DSAS), it can be concluded that the price to be 
paid for being in imbalance can be both higher and lower in 
the DSAS market. The maximum price in the dual sided 
market is known in advance and is never higher than the own 
λAS 
λimb 
Eimb (imbalance BRP) 
EAS cleared capacity at DSAS 
λimb 
Max volume DS AS market 
ACE 
λimb 
λAS 
Dual sided 
Single sided 
λimb= * λAS 
bid as long as the own cleared capacity is not being used. 
Figure 3 illustrates that participation in the DSAS has the 
characteristic that within its cleared capacity, the price for 
being in imbalance within the cleared volume is known a 
priori. In the SSAS arrangement, the imbalance price is, a 
priori, unknown and determined a posteriori. In the next 
section it is shown that λimb is the maximum price. In average 
it will be lower, depending on the arrangement selected for 
passive balancing. 
 
C. Correlation among imbalances of BRP’s 
Depending on the source of the uncertainty of the BRP 
production and/or consumption, there can be no, small, large 
or complete correlation among the imbalances of the BRPs.  
When the sources of uncertainty are fully uncorrelated, the 
sum of all imbalances will be, on average, zero. The 
uncorrelated imbalances of the BRPs cancel each other. So, 
the TSO will call, on average, no AS resources and the costs 
for imbalance will be low. If BRP_R is the number of BRPs 
being in imbalance, the correlation 𝝆 can be approximated by  
 
 
When the sources for uncertainty are fully correlated, so all 
imbalances have the same sign, the correlation 𝝆 will be 1 (or 
-1) and the global imbalance will have its maximum value. 
The sum of the imbalance volumes and the sum of the 
volumes AS called by the TSO from the BRP_S BRPs 
supplying AS on request of TSO, EASs, will be equal. 
Summarizing: 
 
This indicates that the correlation 𝝆 among the imbalances 
matters. The higher the correlation, the more AS will be 
called. With 𝝆=0, the BRPs causing imbalances cancel the 
global imbalance completely. No AS has to be called by the 
TSO.  
 
D. TSO neutrality 
For a proper regulation it is necessary to guarantee that the 
TSO, which is responsible for balancing, has no financial 
interest in executing its role in determining the imbalance 
price. A consequence will be that the TSO has to be 
financially neutral and that in each PTU the costs and rewards 
are being balanced among the BRPs. When considering the 
correlation 𝝆 among the BRPs, only the situation with |𝝆|=1 
is clear. The BRPs supplying AS will get their reward, while 
the BRPs being in imbalance have to pay. Both sums are 
about equal and the TSO will be neutral after the a posteriori 
accounting transactions. 
 
When |𝝆| <1, some BRPs being in imbalance will reduce the 
global imbalance by passively balancing the system. It is 
assumed that the supplying BRPs still receive the cleared 
price at the AS market (DSAS). Consequently, the price for 
BRPi for AS (λAS) and the price for being in imbalance (λimb) 
depends, both for the single and dual sided AS markets, on 
the following arrangements. A BRP being in imbalance, but 
passively balancing the system (so sign of its imbalance 
opposite the sign of the global system imbalance), can  
1. Pay: any imbalance has to be paid 
2. Pay/receive nothing: Pay/receive nothing 
3. Receive: passive balancing is rewarded 
 
Owing to the size of correlation 𝝆 both the price for being in 
active imbalance and the price paid for passively contributing 
to reducing the imbalance in each PTU have to be reduced. 
To make these reductions separately visible, in E-Price two 
different reduction factors have been introduced: 
 The prices for paying are reduced with a factor  (0≤≤1) 
 The prices for receiving when passive balancing the 
system are reduced with a factor  (0 ≤  ≤ 1). 
The consequences of this modification are show in table 1.  
When the uncertainties of all BRPs are fully correlated, so |𝝆| 
= 1, there is no passive balancing. Then  = 1 and  is not 
relevant. In all other situations  and  have to be selected 
such that the budget the TSO receives equals the budget the 
TSO has to pay for the called AS energy. In all cases, the 
solutions will satisfy 0 ≤  ≤  ≤ 1. As there is only one 
constraint (keeping financial transaction in one PTU neutral) 
and two variables ( and ), there are many solutions. When 
comparing the 3 different arrangements, it turns out that 
arrangement 2 (Nothing) is a special case of arrangement 3 
(Receive) by selecting  = 0. Two reasonable choices are  = 
1 (highest reward for passive balancing) or  = 0 (lowest AS 
costs). In both choices, the other variable follows from the 
financial neutrality requirement in each PTU.  
 
Table 1: Corrected price for being in imbalance, depending on being active 
contributing to the system imbalance or passive balancing and on whether 
the own imbalance (Eimb) in within the cleared capacity (EAS) at the AS 
market (Eimb ≤ EAS) or outside (Eimb> EAS). The sign of the prices is neglected 
in this survey. When price is printed in bold, the BRP has to pay, when price 
printed italic the BRP will receive. 
 
 
Active 
imbalance 
Active 
imbalance 
Passive 
balancing 
Passive 
balancing 
Arrangement Eimb ≤ EAS Eimb> EAS Eimb ≤ EAS Eimb> EAS 
1: Pay *λAS *λimb *λAS *λimb 
2: Nothing *λAS *λimb 0 0 
3: Receive *λAS *λimb *λimb *λimb 
 
E. Comparison SSAS and DSAS 
In a DSAS, a requester can limit its liabilities for being in 
imbalance by bidding for a capacity AS when needed with a 
maximum price. When the market is cleared, the BRP can be 
sure that the cleared price is lower than its own costs. Within 
its cleared volume, the price for being in imbalance is known 
and lower than it is prepared to pay for. The price to be paid 
for its risk reduction is a fixed amount of money proportional 
with the reserved amount of AS capacity. So, a requester of 
AS can evaluate its costs for risk reduction and, if considered 
to be profitable, can make its bids on the DSAS. 
Several other remarks can be made to characterize both SSAS 
and DSAS:  
 The BRPs with imbalance have to pay according to their 
value of Eimb at the end of each PTU. The BRPs that are 
called by the TSO to deliver AS are paid by the called 
AS energy during a PTU. Consequently, even in a 
situation with |𝝆| = 1, the sum of the imbalances Eimb 
need not to be equal to the total amount of called AS 
control energy. 
 To maintain the relation between λAS  and λimb only one  
is being used. The added freedom of introducing  allows 
making a compromise between rewarding passive 
balancing and penalizing being in imbalance. A similar 
parameter, which regulates the rewards gained by passive 
balancing, already exists in the Dutch power market. It is 
called “the incentive component” and can change within 
a day. Rewarding passive balancing is being paid by 
BRPs being in active imbalance, not by the BRPs 
supplying requested AS when called by the TSO. A 
larger  will introduce a larger . 
 In the SSAS solution implemented in The Netherlands 
there is only one price λimb. Financial neutrality of the 
TSO is approximately achieved by selecting  =  = 1. 
 As it is difficult for a BRP to predict whether it will 
cause or reduce the global imbalance in a PTU, the best 
arrangement can be defined when, on average, the 
consequences of causing or reducing the global 
imbalance cancel each other. Then, too many, sometimes 
counteracting, control actions at the end of a PTU can be 
avoided. The market design parameters  and  influence 
the costs of being active in imbalance and the possible 
rewards of passive balancing. By increasing the rewards 
(increasing ), also the costs of being in imbalance will 
increase. Yet, no statement can be made about the best 
values in a given market environment. 
 
It has been argued that the DSAS is profitable for the supplier 
of AS and can be profitable for a requester of AS. It depends 
on the introduced market design parameters a, ,  and  
how much these possible gains can be realized. It is a trade-
off between low AS costs and still sufficient liquidity for the 
AS markets. 
 
F. Comparison between AS markets and the IDM 
As stated earlier, uncertainty arises from errors in the 
prediction of production and consumption of tenths of hours 
ahead. As the ahead markets close in general about 12 hours 
before starting real-time operation and a day takes 24 hours, 
predictions have to be made of PTU’s from 12 to 36 hours 
ahead. This large time interval introduces large errors. These 
errors can be reduced by reducing the time between closing 
the markets and starting real time. However, many 
participants in the power system want to have some guarantee 
in time that their positions can be guaranteed. So, another 
mechanism to reduce uncertainty is the introduction of the 
ahead intraday market (IDM), much closer to real time (one 
hour ahead), but with considerably less volume. It is intended 
to adjust parties own positions as prediction errors decrease 
with reduced ahead times. 
 
A real difference between AS markets and the IDM is that at 
the IDM, just like the day ahead markets (EX, PX), contracts 
deal with volumes, while at the AS markets the trade is in 
capacities that can be (partly) called only when needed. A 
transaction at the IDM can turn out to be counterproductive. 
In The Netherlands, the IDM is not largely used. In Germany 
it is, but there the TSO has to cope with the large 
uncertainties of the considerable amounts of renewables. 
In our separate simulation study [5], based on the assumption 
that stochastic phenomena of the disturbances can be 
neglected and that only their statistical properties need to be 
taken into account, the selection of these market parameters 
and a comparison with IDM have been made.  
A BRP has to assess its probability density function of its net 
exchange with the grid, as illustrated in figure 4. That 
function depends on the uncertainty of its own production and 
consumption. 
 
 
Figure 4. A probability density function of a BRP’s expected exchange with 
the grid in a PTU. 
The mean value can be traded at the day ahead market (EX). 
However, there is a very large probability that there will be 
an imbalance. By selecting a security level of being in 
balance with the aid of acquired AS (indicated with R+ and R- 
in figure 4) at the DSAS, the probability for being in 
imbalance in real time can be reduced considerably, e.g., to 
the dashed encircled areas in the figure. However, requesting 
too much AS has a price, so a compromise has to be made 
between the costs and the risks. That compromise is at the 
core of the risk strategy of a BRP [1]. 
In the following example an indication is given of different 
approaches for a BRP with a 100 MW wind farm to reduce its 
uncertainty with realistic measured data from Dutch wind 
farms [2]. The prediction error 24 hours ahead for wind 
power has been calculated over 1 year of wind observations 
and is represented as a probability density function as 
elucidated in figure 5. 
In the same way the prediction error due to wind forecast for 
1 hour ahead has been calculated and represented as a 
probability density function to mimic the ability to reduce the 
imbalance by utilizing the IDM. Table 2 illustrates that with a 
required security level (in table 4 selected as 95, 50 and 0 %) 
the cleared capacities of AS can be acquired at the DSAS 
which effectively reduces the remaining imbalance.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of the (normalized) prediction error due to (NL) wind 
power forecast errors 24 hours ahead. 
 
Table 2. Cleared capacities at the DSAS and remaining imbalance depending 
on selected security level, normalized to the energy traded at the EX (=100 
[%]). 
security level  [%] 95 50 0 
up regulating AS  [%] 49 18 0 
down regulating AS  [%] -66 -19 0 
remaining imbalance up [%] 0.5 5.6 12.4 
remaining imbalance down[%] -0.5 -5.1 -12.1 
With the same approach a comparison has been made among 
a BRP fully relying on the imbalance system, a BRP 
acquiring its needed additional volumes at the IDM one hour 
in advance and a BRP utilizing the DSAS.  
 
Table 3. Net revenue BRP of strategy: no actions to reduce imbalance, using 
IDM or using DSAS (95% security level). 
 
 only 
imbalance 
IDM, 
imbalance 
DSAS, 
imbalance 
revenue EX [M€/year] 15.61 15.61 15.61 
all imbalance costs 
[M€/year] 
-0.62 -0.49 0.23 
net revenue [M€/year] 14.99 15.12 15.84 
 
In Table 3 it is illustrated that in the DSAS approach a BRP 
can benefit from offering ancillary services and passive 
balancing. To make a fair comparison, the capacity costs have 
to be discussed. In The Netherlands the TSO has reserved 300 
MW continuously for AS at a cost of about 40 M€ per year, 
so about 135 k€/MWyear. These costs are socialized in the 
power system, so they are attributed in some way to the 
producers/consumers.  
 
Table 4. Net revenue, capacity costs and resulting final revenue  depending 
on strategy of  BRP: no actions to reduce imbalance, using IDM or using 
DSAS (with 95% security level and a=0.1) 
 only 
imbalance 
IDM, 
imbalance 
DSAS, 
imbalance 
revenue at EX 
[M€/year] 
15.61 15.61 15.61 
all imbalance costs 
[M€/year] 
-0.62 -0.49 0.23 
net revenue [M€/year] 14.99 15.12 15.84 
capacity costs 
[M€/year] 
-0.33 -0.33 -0.63 
final revenue 
[M€/year] 
14.66 14.79 15.21 
final revenue [%] 100 101 104 
 
In the DSAS these capital costs can be assumed to be 
included in the fixed parameter a. In the 2 other cases, they 
have to be added artificially. There is much freedom to assign 
these costs and how to select the parameter a. The 
consequences of a reasonable choice (low AS costs and still 
sufficiently AS liquidity) of these parameters are shown in 
Table 4. 
This example suggests that exploiting the IDM can be 
profitable. When a DSAS is available, that market is more 
profitable compared with relying on the IDM and is even 
more profitable when being unprepared for its own 
uncertainty and, consequently being enforced to pay the 
imbalance price. 
There are many opportunities to maximize the rewards of the 
different strategies, all depending on assumptions about 
prices, probabilities and the reaction of other BRPs and the 
TSO on the markets and in real time. 
 
The benefits of the proposed DSAS compared with an IDM 
can be summarized as follows: 
 the remaining imbalance of BRPs can be made very 
small and is controllable by the security level selected or 
by the confidence interval of uncertainties that are 
hedged, 
 the incorporation of the capacity costs in the DSAS, 
which is an important distinction with current practice, 
e.g. intraday markets, is a suitable option compared with 
present day auction for 1 year, 
 the DSAS enables the synergies between a capacity 
market and the activation of the bids by means of the 
secondary controller of the TSO. In this approach first all 
system imbalances are aggregated and only thereafter 
correcting actions are undertaken, whereas the IDM 
alone leads to a reduction of individual (BRP) 
imbalances independent of status of the system 
imbalance., 
 it is reasonable to state that a DSAS yields more 
flexibility for BRPs to hedge against uncertainties than 
only exploiting IDM. The DSAS allows trade in 
capacities which are reserved, but need not to be taken. 
The IDM deals with volumes which have to be taken, 
even if its imbalance was already passive balancing the 
system.  
Therefore the DSAS is a well suited market system to 
facilitate an increase of renewable generation without 
additional costs for society for reserving power by the TSO. It 
allows BRPs to deal efficiently with their uncertainties. 
Instead of reducing them with own means, cheaper solutions 
offered by other BRPs at the DSAS can be utilized. 
 
IV. NETWORK CONSTRAINTS AT SYSTEM LEVEL 
With large scale employment of renewable energy (e.g. some 
200 Gigawatts of additional renewable sources in EU by 
2020), satisfying and “guarding” the global constraints 
(global power balance, transmission system limits) will 
become more and more challenging. Also, locations where 
distributed generation enters the power grid are different 
when compared to traditional system and future power 
system will be characterized with new power flow patterns. 
These patterns will be highly uncertain and time varying. It is 
particularly a challenging task to create efficient solutions on 
the EU level (the term global then means EU power grid). 
Expected renewable-energy based grid will change cross 
border exchanges, will make them more dynamical, and past 
long-time gathered experiences of controlling the grid will 
lose some of its value. In future, we will be forced to rely 
much more on holistic scientific solutions, and much less on 
experience which will be both scarce and cryptic (unclear 
how to exploit). It is also increasingly important for market 
and control solutions to fully use all the existing transmission 
capacity and to ensure robust operation of the system even in 
cases of congestion. On a long run, such solutions will send 
proper signals for optimal investments in the grid, and will 
accelerate investments in dispersed generation and in new 
technologies. Interpreting all global power systems problems 
in terms of global constraints which are to be guarded (in an 
uncertain time-varying environment) is insightful and a very 
useful (constructive) way to formulate these problems. 
 
It is important to note that a trade-off between efficiency and 
reliability is an inherent property of a system with 
uncertainty.  
 
Figure 6: Trade-offs are inherent but also design dependent. A better design 
pushes the red line to the origin. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates this unavoidable trade-off as larger safety 
margins to deal with uncertainty will introduce higher costs. 
Efficiency is the objective function that we like to maximize, 
while reliability is a set of constraints that limit our feasible 
set. Then strengthening the constraints (increasing reliability) 
network constraints not only influence the ahead markets for 
energy but also influence the supply and need of ancillary 
services, such that in real-time at any foreseeable disturbance 
sufficient AS can be made available without violating the 
network constraints [3]. In real-time, imbalances caused by 
changes in nodal prosumptions activate units which are 
contracted at AS markets to change their prosumptions with 
the goal to restore balance in the system. So, changes in the 
line power flows are caused by changes in uncontrollable and 
uncertain nodal prosumptions, and by controlled changes in 
prosumptions of units that supply AS services. The former we 
cannot control, but would like to have some knowledge 
about, while the latter we can control and we have to take 
care that it is controlled in such a way that line flow limits  
are not exceeded. The spatial dimension of this problem is 
obvious as whichever line in the network we observe, how 
large change of the power flow in this line will be due to the 
change in some nodal prosumption, heavily depends on 
where that particular node is. 
 
Example: In E-Price relevant contributions have been made 
to create pan-European markets for energy and ancillary 
services [3]. 
 
Figure 7. Transmission system topology used in real-time simulations.  
Unique solutions have been derived to account for 
transmission system constraints in AS market clearing. The 
transmission network topology, as used in the simulations, is 
presented in Figure 7. The Netherlands, which is in the figure 
indicated with green area, is modeled by 8 nodes. The 
neighboring countries are approximated with less nodes. The 
cross-border connections are with Norway and GB (DC-lines) 
and 3 AC lines with Germany and 2 AC-lines with Belgium. 
The main goal of this example is to present results of 
locational (nodal) pricing approach for forward time ancillary 
services markets. We present the market clearing results for 
both energy and AS markets, with the aim to illustrate in 
which way is locational pricing in AS markets similar to the 
locational pricing in energy market. The simulated outcome 
of the market clearing prices for energy within the 
Netherlands are presented in Figure 8, while the 
corresponding flows in the lines are presented in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 8. Cleared energy prices (Euro/MWh) over 24 hours. 
 
When there is no unique price in the system, it must be that at 
least one tie-line in the transmission network is at its power 
flow limit (nominal power flow limit). In Figures 8 and 9 this 
can be observed for the hours 10 to 18. In that time interval 
power flow in line 5 is, according to the economically 
optimal market clearing results, at its nominal power flow 
limit of 2000 MW.  During that time interval, there is no 
unique price in the system (see Figure 8). In case of ancillary 
services markets, the situation is similar, and described as 
follows. In Figure1 10 we can observe power flows and the 
“uncertainty power flow tube” in the congestion critical line 
in the system, that is, in line 5 (see also Figure 9). Note that 
when the uncertainty tube “touches” the security line flow 
limit (hour 9, i.e. around 3x104 seconds, in Figure 10) we no 
longer have unique market clearing price for AS in the 
system, but each node in general has different AS price.  
 
Figure 9. Power flows (MW) in the lines (8 lines within NL) as scheduled 
during energy market clearing. 
 
 
Figure 10. Power flow [MW] in line 5 with nominal value 2000 MW. 
Green line: tie-line power flow as calculated (predicted) during the energy 
market clearing 
Blue line: real-time realized (simulated) power flow in the tie-line. Deviation 
of the blue line from the green line originates both from unpredicted changes 
in load/wind and from activation of AS. 
Gray shaded area: is what we will call the uncertainty tube. It is the area 
for which we can guarantee that the corresponding tie-line power flow will 
remain in (possibly after a transient excursion outside that area). We 
guarantee that the AS control action is such that it will not allow power flows 
to stay outside gray area for longer time periods, or more precisely, that 
trajectories always converge to within the gray areas. 
                                                        
1 See the legend below the figure for explanations, especially for the 
definition of the term “uncertainty tube”, which plays crucial role in AS 
markets clearing. 
Black dashed line: Nominal line power flow limit (valid and applied in the 
energy market clearing) of 2000 MW. 
Red dashed line: Security line power flow limit (valid and applied in the AS 
markets clearing) of 2250 MW. 
The analogy with the ahead market clearing (Fig. 8 and 9) is 
obvious. However, we have to emphasize that the algorithmic 
solutions for calculating optimal locational AS prices are by 
no means simple extension of the locational pricing 
algorithms in the energy market, which are well known and 
utilized in practice (e.g. in USA). In the AS market clearing, 
we do not have one singe scalar variable representing power 
flow in a line, as it is the case in energy market, but we have 
to deal with the whole set of uncertain power flows (the 
“uncertainty tube”). Calculation of optimal AS locational 
prices is based on the robust optimization techniques in 
combination with Lagrange duality theory. The detailed 
algorithms have been developed and have presented within 
the E-Price project [6]. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
E-Price identified the maximization of security of supply and 
market efficiency as the two main objectives of power system 
operation. The conflicting nature of these objectives is 
reflected in the decisions and actions taken by the TSO and 
the profit-driven BRPs. E-Price proposed two concepts which 
allow a better compromise than existing arrangements: the 
dual-sided ancillary service markets (DSAS) and locational 
prices both for energy and ancillary services in both ahead 
markets and in real-time. The DSAS design is defined by 4 
design parameters which shape its real implementation. It is 
shown that is has favourable characteristics for BRPs to deal 
with their trade-off between profits and risk management 
compared with single-sided AS or intraday market 
arrangements. In congestion management the tension between 
reliability and economic efficiency is particularly apparent. 
Locational prices have shown to be an appropriate tool for 
solving, in an optimal way, that trade-off. They have been 
implemented on a close-to reality physical model with 8 
separate nodes (copper plates) in The Netherlands. In all 
realistic simulation studies with considerable uncertainty, 
still, the network constraints remained satisfied. The proposed 
algorithms are scalable and can be implemented for the EU 
power system. 
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